Liberal Interpretations of Social Justice for Social Work by McLaughlin, Anne Marie
© Currents: New Scholarship in the Human Services, 2006 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
Liberal Interpretations of Social Justice for Social Work 
Anne-Marie McLaughlin 
Abstract 
 
Social justice has been called a defining value for social work (Wakefield, 
1988). For clinical social workers this link has been seen as tenuous. 
Current interpretations of the meaning of social justice for social work 
trace their roots to John Rawls and his treatise “A theory of justice”. 
Rawls’s political theory is a liberal one aimed at the “basic structure of 
society” and how certain primary goods are distributed so as to respect 
the basic worth and dignity of all people. This article examines Rawls’s 
justice as fairness and contrasts it with a modern liberal feminist 
interpretation provided by Nussbaum.  Nussbaum’s “capability approach” 
rejects the notion of justice as the distribution of resources and instead 
advances a claim for justice that secures for each individual the 
opportunity to function in a “truly human” way.  She articulates a 
universal list of human capabilities that all societies and governments 
must embrace in their pursuit of social justice. The implications of a 
liberal perspective on social justice for social work and particularly 
clinical work are explored. 
 
Introduction: Finding Justice 
 
Social justice has frequently been characterized as the mission of social 
work. It has been called by some social work’s defining value 
(Wakefield, 1988a, 1988b).  Social work and social justice are bound 
together such that “the future of social work depends on the future of 
social justice as a concept and a construct that holds together the edifice 
of a civil society” (Mohan, 1999, p. 118). It is possible that social justice 
may be more important to social work than the person-in-situation 
construct more recently emphasized (Swenson, 1998). Social justice has 
the potential to unite disparate arms of social work and may signal to all 
social workers that “they are partners in the same profession” (1998, p. 
537). 
Clinical social work especially that associated with psychotherapy 
has frequently been vilified as the antithesis of progressive and libratory 
social justice (Specht, 1990; Specht & Courtney, 1994). A clinical 
approach to social work has been equated to one that pathologizes 
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marginalized individuals. Clinical social workers have been more 
frequently thought of as agents of social control than agents of social 
justice (Margolin, 1997), “a concern is that narrow clinical models could 
unintentionally encourage clients to become better prisoners in poorer 
jails” (Vodde & Gallant, 2002, p. 455). A focus on the individual and 
their problems is equated with supporting the status quo and seen as an 
impediment to social justice. Tension regarding the legitimacy of clinical 
social work and its relationship to social justice has existed within the 
profession since its inception (McLaughlin, 2002). Yet, common 
agreement as to what actually constitutes social justice is lacking. 
In an attempt to clarify what is distinct about social work, Wakefield 
(1988a, 1988b) suggests a need to better articulate social work’s mission. 
He asserts that the mission is in fact minimal distributive justice, “social 
work …, is ultimately concerned with ensuring that each individual 
possesses at least the minimal acceptable level of each of the primary 
social goods, a goal … labeled minimal distributive justice” (Wakefield, 
1998, p. 29). Social justice provides a unifying conceptual framework 
which holds the potential ultimately to distinguish social work, including 
clinical social work, from other helping professions. Distributive justice 
rightly characterizes social work as the safety net profession. Wakefield, 
along with several other noted scholars in social work today (Scanlon & 
Longres, 2001; Pelton, 2001; Reamer, 1993), derives notions of social 
justice from Rawls’ treatise A Theory of Justice (1971).  
The capabilities perspective has recently been advanced as an 
alternative conceptualization of social justice for social work (McGrath 
Morris, 2002). This perspective eschews an emphasis on the distribution 
of things in favour of attention to an individual’s well being and their 
achievement of valuable functioning. Valuable functioning expresses 
something more than achievement of some arbitrary or pre-determined 
level of functioning. It implies the freedom to choose between meaningful 
alternatives in life (Sen, 1999). A just society, from the capabilities 
perspective, is one that ensures individuals have an opportunity to make 
meaningful choices in order to attain their own sense of well-being. The 
capabilities that must be secured include such fundamentals as the 
capability to live a full life without fear of premature death, the capability 
to have good health including sexual health and to have security and 
sovereignty over one’s own body. Nussbaum (1999, 2000) has articulated 
this perspective best.  As a student of Rawls, Nussbaum incorporates 
aspects of justice as fairness but addresses noted weaknesses by bringing 
a liberal feminist perspective. This paper will take an in-depth look at 
these two approaches to social justice: justice as fairness espoused by 
Rawls, and the capabilities perspective articulated by Nussbaum. 
Together, these theories articulate a view of social justice that gives 
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credence to Wakefield’s view of social justice as a conceptual framework 
for all social work and legitimizes clinical social work’s social justice 
claims. 
Justice as Fairness 
 
The theory of justice as fairness is based on the premise of a social 
contract, which hypothesizes implicit agreement between members of 
society regarding what constitutes social justice. From this agreement 
basic principles are chosen that form the foundations for a “well-ordered 
society” (p. 4). Society is viewed as “a cooperative venture for mutual 
advantage” (p. 84).  Members of society agree that working together 
improves their chances of obtaining happiness and fulfillment. Without 
this social agreement everyone would be worse off. Fairness requires that 
one person’s advantage is not obtained at the expense of another. This is 
in contrast to utilitarian theories of justice that attempt to maximize 
overall fulfillment without attention to how that fulfillment might be 
distributed. Justice as fairness also stipulates that individuals who benefit 
from this society of mutual cooperation have concomitant duties and 
obligations: to respect just institutions, to do their fair share and to keep 
their promises (Rawls, p. 114).  
Members of society share an “identity of interests” (p. 126), because 
working together increases everyone’s chance of obtaining their goals in 
life.  At the same time there exist “conflicts of interests” (p. 126).  
Conflict arises because individuals hold different ideas about what 
constitutes a good life. While working together is desirable and 
beneficial, competition is inevitable. Through the pursuit of various life 
plans, individuals compete for scarce resources, pursue different political 
agendas and enjoy various religious and political affiliations. Conflict in 
these areas creates the tension that produces the background or 
“circumstances for justice” (Rawls, p. 126) from which the need for a 
social contract arises.  
 
Primary goods 
 
From a Rawlsian perspective, social justice is concerned with the “basic 
structure of society” (p. 7). This structure is comprised of our major 
political, economic and social institutions. It is through these institutions 
that primary social goods are distributed. Primary social goods include 
“rights, and liberties, opportunity and powers, income and wealth” (p. 
92). Access to these goods will greatly influence how and if an individual 
is able to fulfill their particular life plan. However, deep inequities exist 
among members of society. Individuals born into influential families, or 
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great wealth, are viewed to be in a favored position whereas those born in 
poverty are disadvantaged. These differences “cannot be justified by an 
appeal to the notions of merit or dessert” (Rawls, p. 7). Justice attempts to 
“mitigate the influence of social contingencies” (p. 73).  These 
contingencies include both natural endowment (talents such as a great 
singing voice) and one’s “starting place” (p. 96) in life (born to wealth or 
born in poverty). Such arbitrary (as opposed to deserved) differences are 
viewed as unjust.  Justice as fairness requires that social institutions 
moderate differences. This is accomplished through adherence to a set of 
principles that regulate social and economic inequalities and distribute 
rights and obligations (Rawls, 1971). 
Rawls sets apart a particular set of primary goods, “health and vigor, 
intelligence and imagination” (p. 62), defining them as natural as opposed 
to social goods, and not connected to, or regulated through, our basic 
institutions.  As we shall see later, this is a source of some disagreement 
with Nussbaum (2000). 
Self-respect is the most important primary good (Rawls, 1971). 
Without it individuals would be unable to take advantage of other 
economic and social primary goods. Self-respect is made up of two parts: 
a belief in one’s self and confidence in one’s ability. It is self-respect that 
gives an individual energy, conviction, and the drive required to pursue 
their life plan.  Self-respect is constructed socially (Rawls, 1971). Being 
appreciated, admired and respected by others enhances self-respect. A 
community of individuals with shared or “complementary” (p. 441) 
interests are essential for self-esteem. The community provides the 
individual the opportunity to interact with like-minded others who 
validate and support efforts to realize one’s life plan. Ideally individuals 
may belong to several different communities thereby increasing the 
likelihood of affirmation. At least one “community of shared interests” (p. 
442) is vital for the flourishing self.  
 
The social contract 
 
Rawls builds his theory of justice as fairness from an imaginary 
agreement known as the social contract. This contract is negotiated by 
representative individuals from society. Those who negotiate this 
agreement are said to stand in the “original position” (p. 17); a 
hypothetical starting point from which basic principles of governance are 
developed.  This device is employed to assist in determining how 
members of society, if they are born equal and free, might come to choose 
laws to safeguard their freedoms and regulate their institutions 
(Kymlicka, 2002). Rawls’ central concern is to articulate principles to 
guide the just distribution of “burdens and benefits” as well as “rights and 
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duties” (p. 4). These basic principles are negotiated during the original 
position. Representative persons in the original position are assumed to be 
free, equal in capacity and rational (Rawls, 1971).  
Negotiations are conducted behind a metaphorical “veil of 
ignorance” (p. 136). Behind the veil no individual is aware of what 
material or natural assets he or she might posses, what community or 
family ties exist, or even what gender or age they may be. Nor are they 
aware of anyone else’s attachments. This veil is necessary to ensure that 
the procedure for agreeing to the principles is fair and just.   Fairness 
requires that no advantage or bias be a factor when deciding upon the 
foundation of a just system. Justice requires that “no arbitrary distinctions 
[be] made between persons in the assigning of basic rights and duties and 
[that] the rules determine a proper balance between competing claims” (p. 
5). Each member is viewed as equal to every other member. Individuals 
behind the veil agree in advance to comply with the outcome of these 
negotiations, thus establishing the “public conception of justice” (Rawls, 
1971, p. 133). 
Individuals in the original position are said to be rational. Although 
individuals do not know their future life plan they are capable of 
determining one. Further they know that they will want more of, rather 
than less of, the goods that would help secure that life plan, whatever it 
may be. In addition, representative individuals posses “a regulative desire 
to act upon certain principles of right” (p. 561). Rawls (1971) asserts that 
all individuals have an intuitive sense of justice although this may vary 
from individual to individual.  
The notion of “mutual disinterest” (Rawls, 1971, p. 143) is also 
important to the parties in the original position. Individuals are said to be 
disinterested in the sense that they are concerned more with their own life 
plan than with the plans of others. They are not affected by “envy”, 
“affection” or “rancor” (p. 144), as these emotions would impose a 
disadvantage. This is rational in that those in the original position are 
primarily concerned with securing their own ends. Rawls (1971) cautions 
that mutual disinterest should not be interpreted as “egoism” (p.147) as 
once the veil is removed, individuals “find that they have ties of 
sentiment and affection, and want to advance the interests of others and to 
see their ends attained” (p. 129).  
 
Two principles of justice 
 
Two foundational principles of justice evolve from negotiations between 
representative persons in the original position. The first principle is 
concerned primarily with individual liberty and the assignment of rights 
and duties. This principle stipulates “each person is to have an equal right 
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to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for 
others” (p.60). These shared basic rights include, 
 
political liberties (the right to vote and to be eligible for public 
office) together with freedom of speech and assembly; the liberty 
of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the person 
along with the right to hold personal property; and freedom from 
arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of 
law (Rawls, 1971, p. 61) 
 
Duties follow from these liberties, some of which include mutual 
respect and mutual aid, the duty not to harm, and an obligation to do your 
part in society. As Rawls (1971) states “We are not to gain from the 
cooperative efforts of others without doing our fair share” (p. 343). 
 The second principle, otherwise known as the “difference principle” 
(p.75), deals with the basic institutions and states that “social and 
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both a) 
reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage and b) are attached to 
positions and offices open to all” (p. 60). These two principles fall in 
“serial or lexical order” (p.42) with the liberty principle to be satisfied 
first. Also, there can be no exchange between basic liberties and social 
and economic gain. In a summary statement Rawls (1971) expresses that 
“all social values – liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the 
basis of self-respect – are to be distributed equally unless an unequal 
distribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone’s advantage” (p. 
62). 
An important concept following from the difference principle is that 
of “redress” as we have seen, inequality occurs through birth as some are 
born into favorable social circumstances and some are not. Inequalities 
also occur through the lottery of “natural endowments” (p.100). The 
difference principle, founded on the notion of equality of opportunity, 
directs us to give extra attention to those who, through no fault of their 
own, find themselves in a less advantageous position. For instance, 
resources may be redirected to the education of those less advantaged. 
The result or redressing inequity is not only improvement in one’s 
financial prospects, but, keeping in mind the primary good of self-respect, 
improvement in an individual’s self-confidence, their ability to participate 
in society and to contribute to the enrichment of their own life plan, what 
ever that may be.   
When interpreting the second principle note that Rawls in not a strict 
egalitarian as inequalities are permissible (Shaw, 1992). This is true as 
long as the inequity produces improvement in the expectations of the least 
well off.  For example one person’s greater income is justifiable only if it 
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in turn will increase the prospects of the less well off person. This has 
been a source of criticism concerning justice as fairness as inequity is in 
itself a source of injustice (see Schaller, 1998). Rawls cautions us 
however that there must be constraints to these inequities and they must 
not violate the prior principles of justice including liberty and fair 
opportunity, “the spread of income and wealth should not be excessive in 
practice, given the requisite background institutions” (p. 536). Justice is a 
social arrangement whereby individuals should not gain at another’s 
expense and where only reciprocal advantages are allowed.  The social 
contract emphasizes a “harmony of interests” (p. 105).  
 
Procedural justice 
 
As we have seen, justice as fairness is not concerned with an equal 
outcome for all. Rather it is concerned with principles that govern the fair 
and equal treatment of individuals within society. This is achieved 
through “pure procedural justice” (p.85).  Rules or principles designed 
behind the veil are what Rawls believes to be an example of pure 
procedural justice. Procedural justice is differentiated from the imperfect 
procedural justice of a trial. For instance in the latter strict adherence to 
the agreed upon rules may occasionally result in an incorrect verdict; “an 
innocent man may be found guilty” (p.86). When we engage in pure 
procedural justice no such errors can be made. To illustrate, Rawls (1971) 
instructs us to think of a poker game. As long as the rules are fair and 
freely agreed upon at the outset, and provided that no one cheats, the 
outcome of the game is fair. The rules, set out in advance of the game, are 
the background conditions to fairness and the focus of concern. So it is 
with distributive justice. In order for society to be just our institutions 
must conform to the two principles of justice. All distributions based on 
these conditions will of necessity be fair.  Distributions may in fact be 
unequal but remain fair. On the other hand judging the fairness of the 
distribution by necessity involves judging the fairness of the institutions 
and the rules that they are founded on, “a distribution cannot be judged in 
isolation from the system of which it is the outcome” (Rawls, 1971, p. 
88).  
 
The Capabilities Approach 
Nussbaum (1999) articulates a notion of social justice that closely follows 
in Rawls’ liberal democratic tradition. Like Rawls, Nussbaum conceives 
of individuals as “free and dignified” (p. 46) and of “equal dignity and 
worth” (p. 57). Her modern interpretation updates Rawls from a feminist 
perspective. Nussbaum is centrally concerned with defining social 
McLaughlin 
© Currents: New Scholarship in the Human Services 
Volume 5, Number 1, 2006 
 
8 
conditions, arrangements and practices that foster gender justice (Deveau, 
2002). This liberal feminist viewpoint holds certain central features.  
Fundamental is a belief in the universal basis of human capabilities and 
functioning. Nussbaum has attempted to delineate a core list of 
capabilities that are common to all individuals and define the essence of 
what it means to live a fully human life. The capabilities approach seeks 
for individuals to flourish rather than merely to survive. This approach 
rejects a cultural relativist’s stance which refuses to acknowledge 
common and cross-cultural human needs and potential. Cultural 
relativism from the capabilities perspective equates to the status quo. In 
order to achieve social justice the capabilities position asserts that the 
value and worth of each individual exerts a moral claim on governments 
and society in general to ensure each individual has the space they need to 
fully flourish and live a truly human life (Nussbaum, 1999, 2002). 
 Echoing Rawls (1971), Nussbaum describes the circumstances or 
background conditions that lead to a need for justice; scarcity of 
resources, competition for resources, and threats to life and liberty.  
Individuals, particularly women and children, suffer disproportionately 
from these conditions. Nussbaum’s notion of universalism provides a 
framework to assess quality of life. This universal stance paves the way 
for the central capabilities and human functioning approach.  This is not 
restricted to women as no theory of justice by definition can promote one 
group over another. Nussbaum’s theory is one of human justice 
(Nussbaum, 1999).  
 
Resource based distribution  
 
The capabilities approach arose out of dissatisfaction with traditional 
economic models that measured standard of living through income levels, 
gross national products (GNP) and utility (Schischka, 2002). This 
“commodity approach” (p. 3) centered more on the accumulation of 
goods and less on individual people.  An aggregate measure such as the 
GNP does not inform us about the distribution of that wealth within a 
particular country or within a particular family. The capabilities approach 
believes that human well-being is not measured by income but by options 
and choices available. Better indicators of quality of life include life 
expectancy, infant mortality, educational opportunities, health care, 
employment opportunities, land rights and political liberties (Schischka, 
2002; Sen, 1999; Nussbaum, 2000). Economic approaches arising from 
the capabilities perspective evaluate the development of individuals’ 
capabilities by examining actual options available (Sen, 1999).  Rather 
than focusing on commodities the focus is on the opportunities for 
individuals to exercise capabilities in order to achieve the things they 
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most desire. Beyond the distribution of resources, and the opportunities 
available to maximize social justice, it is essential to look at the 
individual’s capacity to convert resources into functioning and to take 
advantage of opportunities available (Sen, 1999, Shicschka, 2002). 
Frequently there are obstacles to attainment of full functioning. Some 
obstacles are physical as in the case of persons with disabilities, and some 
are social as in the case of barriers to career or work opportunities for 
women, for instance access to quality day care (Nussbaum, 1999, 2000). 
Many obstacles and barriers identified are magnified for women, 
especially across cultures. Customs and political arrangements are 
important causes of women’s misery and mortality.  Past measures of 
economic health marginalized or ignored the situation of women and 
children especially within families. Historically the family has been 
viewed as having as its goal the maximum satisfaction of its members, 
with the head of the household cast as the “beneficent altruist” 
(Nussbaum, 2000, p. 65), concerned with the good of all the family.  In 
actual practice this is not always the case. Women and children within 
families receive unequal amounts of resources such as food, income and 
opportunity. Often women’s needs or desires are subsumed in the service 
of others, are not inquired about, or are simply unknown.  Women living 
under oppressive conditions, in fear of intimidation, or without access to 
information may have “deformed or constricted preferences” (Nussbaum 
1999, p. 34). 
 Deformed preferences. The concept of preferences—what 
individuals actually want or desire—is important in economic as well as 
political theory and influences how nations develop social welfare policy. 
This practice sometimes referred to as subjective welfarism is contested 
by Nussbaum (2000). The problem concerns how society has shaped the 
expression of preferences and desires. Defining social policy in terms of 
preferences results in the continuation of oppressive practices. Many 
countries such as India have preferred to deny women equality 
(Nussbaum, 2000). Preferences are not predetermined but rather are 
social constructions embedded in history and culture.  
 Social norms influence notions of culture, gender, and family 
(Nussbaum, 1999). The family is a powerful socializing institution. Any 
inquiry into social justice must also look within the family. In traditional 
cultures women are often socialized to be meek, passive and subservient. 
Their ability to perceive preferences will be greatly restricted due to 
socialization (Nussbaum, 1999). Clearly a reliance on preferences as 
expressed by a culture or community is viewed as contrary to a position 
of universalism such as the capabilities approach. 
 
Universalism 
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The capabilities approach is controversial as it argues for universal norms 
such as those articulated in Nussbaum’s list of core capabilities 
(Nussbaum, 1999, 2000, 2001b). The core capabilities are premised on a 
belief in the moral worth and equal human dignity of all individuals. The 
capabilities list is presently under development. Nussbaum intended it to 
be discussed, interpreted and applied differentially within various cultures 
and countries. Respect and recognition of cultural pluralism does not limit 
the ability to establish basic human capabilities. However, a certain 
practice, for example female genital mutilation, may hold cultural 
relevance but cannot be held as more important than basic human 
capabilities, such as bodily integrity (Nussbaum, 1999, 2000).  Customs 
and traditions must not take precedence over the basic value of human 
dignity and moral worth. 
Cultural relativism is deconstructed by Nussbaum (1999) who 
accuses some academics of venerating local, traditional customs or 
cultures, even in the face of harm to those involved. Within different 
cultures and religions there exists diversity, complexity, conflict and 
contrast. Nussbaum is not advocating homogenization of the world’s 
cultures, and makes a point of emphasizing that individuals should have 
the choice of following traditional cultures, religions and practices, even 
in situations where those traditions or cultures may involve the 
submission or subservience of women. For many individuals it is the 
engagement with culture or religion that represents ‘the good life’.  
Nussbaum’s concern is that women and people in general should have the 
opportunity to make informed choices, and that the government’s role is 
to ensure that individuals have real opportunity to exercise options.  
 
Social goods or capabilities  
 
Although Nussbaum agrees to some extent with the Rawlsian notion of 
primary social goods she believes this emphasis is too narrow. 
Particularly Nussbaum views Rawls’ exclusion of some primary goods, 
particularly, “health, vigor, intelligence and imagination” (Rawls, 1971, 
p.92), as arbitrary and erroneous. She advocates for the social basis of 
these and includes them in her list of core capabilities. Further, Rawls’ 
emphasis on resources or “thing-like” (Nussbaum, 2000, p. 89) goods 
does not tell the full story of each individual’s quality of life.  The 
capabilities approach is concerned with what the individual is able to do 
with those resources and what the individual is able to become, “the 
Rawlsian model neglects a salient fact of life: that individuals vary 
greatly in their needs for resources and in their abilities to convert 
resources into valuable functioning’s” (Nussbaum, 2002, p. 68). 
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 Like Rawls, Nussbaum contrasts her approach to Utilitarianism. This 
approach from a social policy perspective looks at average utility or some 
aggregate expression of satisfaction (Kymlicka, 2002). Nussbaum 
criticizes this on two fronts; first the individual at the margins is 
overlooked. The average rate of literacy or level of income ignores those 
who fall below--frequently women. This is inconsistent with the notion of 
human worth and dignity as expressed by the capabilities approach. The 
second objection is that even the expressed average level of satisfaction 
may well be distorted if we consider satisfaction to be based on stated 
preference. Preferences may be: adaptive, socially constructed, or shaped 
and constrained by what individuals are reasonably able to obtain. 
Preferences may be severely restricted when they are examined from 
within a culture or society that is defined by oppression and deprivation 
(Nussbaum, 1999). For instance someone who has never had the right to 
own property may not express this as a need. Expressed preferences often 
reflect adaptation to “traditions of male power” (Nussbaum 2000, p. 112) 
and may be “deformed by ignorance, malice, injustice and blind habit” (p. 
114).  
 
Care 
 
The capabilities approach places the notion of dependency, need and care 
in the forefront. Human life is characterized by both profound neediness 
and profound dignity.  Individuals will require care to greater and lesser 
extents throughout their lifetimes. Compassion, self- respect and dignity 
must be afforded to both the needy as well as the caregiver. The feminist 
approach recognizes that women have traditionally taken on the role of 
caregiver and that they have been exploited by this role to a large degree.  
They have been viewed as a means to an end (as care providers) as 
opposed to an end in and of themselves. A just society must arrange for 
the provision of care without the exploitation of the caregiver. As a 
criticism of the Rawlsian approach to social justice Nussbaum contends 
that Rawls unnecessarily places the social institution of the family outside 
the view of justice. Without special attention to issues of dependency and 
care, so central to women’s lives, the resulting basic principles will be 
insufficient and flawed (Nussbaum, 1999, 2000). 
 
Central human capabilities 
 
Nussbaum, in a similar vein to Rawls, suggests that people from different 
backgrounds, cultures, different social positions, as well as different 
worldviews or religious beliefs, can come to a mutual agreement 
regarding the core capabilities. There can be established “overlapping 
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consensus” (Nussbaum, 1999, p. 40) or agreement on what constitutes the 
basis of a good life.  However, in contrast to Rawls, Nussbaum contends 
that it is not the basic structures or institutions of society that are the 
subject of our efforts on behalf of social justice but the individuals 
themselves. Directing attention to the individual is a natural extension of 
“the principle of each person as an end” (Nussbaum, 2000, p. 74, italics 
in original). 
From a political perspective Nussbaum’s (2000) goal in delineating 
the list of human capabilities is two-fold. The first goal is to establish 
“basic political principles to which all nations should be held by their 
citizens”, and the second goal is “to map out the space within which 
comparisons of quality of life across nations can most revealingly be 
made” (Nussbaum, 2000, p. 116). The specification of central human 
capabilities provides a template against which social policy can be 
developed. More importantly it establishes a foundation from which we 
might ensure that each person is living “a truly human” (p. 74) life. 
Nussbaum puts forward the list in order to invite reflection and 
debate (Nussbaum, 2000). The list is “open-ended and humble” (p. 77). It 
is a list of central capabilities or “opportunities for functioning” (p. 74) as 
opposed to actual functioning. This is an important distinction, which 
leaves room for people to exercise choice. For liberal theorists “the right 
of exit” (Deveaux, 2002, p. 507) is a safeguard against abuse and 
oppression. Women can only meaningfully choose to follow tradition and 
custom if other legitimate choices exist.  Nussbaum’s list of central 
capabilities include: life, bodily health, bodily integrity, employment of 
the senses including imagination and thought, emotions, practical reason, 
affiliation, harmony with nature, play, and control over one’s 
environment (Nussbaum, 2000, 1999). Affiliation is reminiscent of Rawls 
central primary good, self-esteem, which he construes as a social derived 
good. 
 Within this list Nussbaum indicates that practical reason and 
affiliation are most important. The list cannot be reduced to these two 
capabilities but practical reason and affiliation infuse truly human 
functioning into all of the others. Practical reason includes the Rawlsian 
notion of liberty of conscience and entails an individual’s ability to “form 
a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the 
planning of one’s life” (Nussbaum, 2000, p. 79). To choose one’s path, or 
to change paths, is an integral part of living a truly human life. To be 
denied opportunity based on culture or religion leads to oppressive 
conditions. The distinction between capability and full functioning is 
important here. Individuals may have the capacity for affiliation without 
fully exercising that capacity, as in certain religious orders (Nussbaum, 
2000).  
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These capabilities, as suggested, should form the basis for an 
evaluation of how a society is meeting the needs of its citizens and 
ensuring their quality of life.  The central capabilities form a type of 
benchmark against which countries may be compared. Nussbaum (2000) 
indicates that these capabilities are all of equal value and cannot be traded 
off against each other such that a greater proportion of one justifies the 
lesser proportion of another.  
By adopting a capabilities approach governments would be agreeing 
to a normative moral claim of the universality of the basic human 
capabilities.  Viewed as human rights, this list of capabilities represents 
the bare minimum that citizens should reasonably expect from their 
governments (Nussbaum, 1999). Political systems could strive to ensure 
that individuals have opportunity to develop these capabilities. They 
could ensure a minimum threshold measure of these capabilities below 
which no individual would be allowed to fall.  A threshold of minimum 
capability is distinguished from that of ensuring some specified level of 
functioning. Individuals must be free to pursue their own life plans, to 
choose to exercise their capabilities, or not. The government’s role is to 
create opportunities for maximizing capabilities. “What the approach is 
after is a society in which persons are treated as each worthy of regard, 
and in which each has been put in a position to live really humanly” 
(Nussbaum, 2000b, p. 234). 
 
Liberalism and Social Justice 
 
Both authors’ theories of social justice are rooted in traditions of 
liberalism. Both hold to the tenets that the moral worth of all human 
beings entitles them to equal dignity, regardless of life circumstances, and 
to liberty and respect. Both may be considered modern liberals as they 
attempt to reconcile individuality with membership in a group (Gaus, 
1983). 
Yet problems concerning liberalism and its emphasis on the 
individual exist. Critics, including communitarians, structuralists and 
some feminists, take issue with various liberal claims. Communitarians 
for instance view this philosophy as too individualistic and fear that ties 
to family and community are negated (Sandel, 1998). Others accuse 
liberalism of promoting self-interest and self-centeredness to the point of 
reducing humans to rational “calculating machines” (Phillips, 2001).  Is 
there a place for such characteristics as benevolence or altruism? In a 
related way some feminists have criticized liberalism for representing 
supposedly male characteristics that overvalue autonomy while 
subjugating one’s commitment to family and community (Gilligan, 1982; 
Moore, 1999).  
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Interestingly, Nussbaum (2000) responds that most liberal positions 
as not individualistic enough. She believes that the gaze of social justice 
must be focused not on one’s community, gender, class or family but on 
the individual in order to gauge how they are faring in terms of the just 
distribution of goods or capabilities. For example economic self-
sufficiency is necessary for individual women in order to liberate them 
from oppressive forms of dependency. This interpretation of liberalism 
sees each person as worthy of attention, apart from whatever family, 
community of culture they belong to. The expressed demands of a 
particular group should not be the focus of political attention but rather 
attention should be directed to the well-being of the individual.  The 
individual is an end, not the means to an end.   Liberalism that fails to 
differentiate between members within a culture, a community or a family 
contributes to the abuse of women and children by failing to appreciate 
women’s hunger, domestic violence, marital rape and unequal access to 
education (Nussbaum, 1999).  Rawls overlooked the patriarchal nature of 
families and possible sources of injustice perpetrated there.   
Communitarians (Sandel, 1982) attack liberal positions of social 
justice as inadequate, failing to give sufficient weight to ties to 
community including duties and obligations. Liberals respond by 
acknowledging these bonds but allotting them less weight (Putman, 
2000). Modern liberals recognize a reciprocal relationship between the 
individual and community. In Nussbaum we see the priority of affiliation 
and an emphasis on “the intrinsic worth of love and care” (Nussbaum, 
2000, p. 246).  Rawls prioritizes self-respect as most important of all the 
social goods, recognizing that this can only be achieved through a 
community of others with shared interests. Social justice for Rawls 
includes “a variety of communities and associations” (p.441) from which 
individuals derive a sense of worth and “common ends” (p. 441). 
Rawlsian principles of “mutual aid” (p. 114) and “mutual respect” (p. 
178) as well as the natural “duty of justice” (p.115) imply an integral 
awareness of and connection to others. 
A basic problem with Rawls’ theory as well as that of Nussbaum’s 
may very well be the liberal political philosophy they rest upon. 
Reasonable social workers may differ about the political underpinnings of 
social work and feel that a liberal approach is not satisfactory. 
Structuralists have equated Liberalism with the status quo. As an example 
they point out that although in theory the welfare system should be 
amenable to reform, inequalities stubbornly persist (Mullaly, 1997). For 
some radical social workers a liberal philosophy must be rejected in favor 
of one that envisions a totally new system, for instance, one that replaces 
capitalism with socialism (Mullaly, 1997).  
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The Fit for Social Work 
 
Nussbaum and Rawls support similar theories of social justice built on 
liberal philosophies of equality and respect for the individual. These 
theories provide a framework for social work, particularly clinical social 
work whose focus is the well-being of the individual.  An emphasis on the 
intrinsic worth and dignity of the individual is a cornerstone of all social 
work values and is written into social work codes of ethics and standards 
of practice (ACSW, CASW, NASW).  Liberalism supplies many 
principles that fit comfortably within clinical social work practice, for 
instance, the notion that individuals are rational beings capable of making 
a life plan. Social work interprets this as client self-determination and 
holds this as a value.  Rawls also recognizes the inherent worth and 
dignity of every individual. This can be seen particularly in his discussion 
of the limits to self-determination when he stipulates that decisions made 
on behalf of others must conform to the principles of justice. Decisions 
made on behalf of others are to be made as if they were in our own self-
interest (Rawls, 1971). This is instructive for social work with involuntary 
clients and those populations requiring guardianship. The social basis of 
self-respect (a Rawlsian primary good), as well as self-esteem and self-
confidence are not only a target of clinical social work but are frequently 
an outcome. Is it any wonder that social work scholars have drawn 
heavily from Rawls treatise, Theory of Justice?   
Nussbaum updates Rawls by introducing contemporary issues and 
broadening our understanding of social justice to include a liberal 
feminist perspective. Nussbaum’s approach is less detailed in some 
respects but more definitive. She takes a clear stand, proposing an open 
list of the most central capabilities or a “set of basic entitlements without 
which no society can lay claim to justice” (Nussbaum, 2002, p. 5).  By 
declaring that basic capabilities are inalienable Nussbaum has produced a 
de facto bill of rights. This assertion is reminiscent of an earlier 
influential social worker that identified “common human need”. Charlotte 
Towle (1987) as early as 1945 recognized the importance of identifying 
and meeting basic human needs as a precursor to full functioning “We fail 
to comprehend the interrelatedness of man’s needs and the fact that 
frequently basic dependency needs must be met first in order that he may 
utilize opportunities for independence” (italics in original, p. 7).  
Rights however, do not go far enough for Nussbaum. Individuals 
must have the real capacity to exercise these rights. The goal of political 
systems is to ensuring that people have the ability and opportunity to 
achieve a meaningful life without specifying what that life should look 
like. Social work may claim a similar goal. Concerned with how the 
individual is actually faring in society social workers—including clinical 
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ones—attempt to maximize functioning. This is not possible without due 
attention and effort directed at the social, political and economic 
institutions that have constrained full functioning for many.   
Wakefield (1988a, 1988b) has pointed out that Rawls’ interpretation 
of social justice with its emphasis on the distribution of primary goods, 
especially self-respect, justifies clinical social work’s commitment to 
working with those affected by mental illness as well as the use of 
psychotherapeutic techniques to meet that end. At the same time Rawls’ 
theory “fits” well with social work as it draws our gaze beyond the 
individual and toward the social, political, and economic institutions that 
regulate the distribution of benefits and burdens in society. Ensuring that 
those institutions are just by holding our basic institutions accountable, is 
an essential task for all social workers concerned with social justice. 
Nussbaum expands this to include important aspects of fully human 
functioning: health, intelligence vigor and imagination. Nussbaum 
suggests that the family should be considered as one of the “basic 
structures” of society (p. 272) in order to ensure that what goes on within 
the family complies with notions of social justice.  By moving beyond 
institutions and setting capabilities for individuals Nussbaum provides a 
context from which comparisons of the quality of life between individuals 
may be made. Rawls attempted to define principles of social justice 
within a bounded state. Nussbaum’s project aims at social justice that is 
global and universal. 
One troubling concern for social work is that both theories fail to 
specify a social minimum.  Society today has an apparently growing 
ability to tolerate wide inequalities on the basis of justice as fairness. 
Nussbaum provides a list as the “basis for determining a decent social 
minimum (2000, p. 75) and encourages debate and discussion but leaves 
further articulation for the future. At the same time she is critical of Rawls 
for his failure to address issues of globalization and his confidence in the 
free market economy. Today Rawls’ position does appear naive 
concerning the fairness of our basic institutions. Even though civil 
disobedience is an option within a just society it is often viewed as 
ineffective as the liberal level of tolerance for disobedience may restrict 
serious attempts to challenge the system (Bleiker, 2002).  
Still, both Rawls and Nussbaum have something important to 
contribute to social work. While focusing on the individual they do not 
ignore or devalue the importance of society, culture and history. Both 
make moral claims of governments to ensure individuals have the 
opportunity to experience full functioning. A frequent criticism of social 
work is that it loses sight of the larger structural or political context from 
which we work. Liberal theories of justice provide clinical social work 
firm foundation for claims of social justice focused simultaneously on the 
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individual and on our basic institutions. Wakefield (1988) calls social 
justice the conceptual framework that unifies social work. Social justice 
may well be the organizing value for all social work practice, including 
clinical social work. In 1988 Wakefield attempted to “entice” social 
workers to enter into the justice literature believing that clinical social 
work would find much of interest there.  This invitation appears more 
relevant today then ever. 
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